In the last few years, two academics, University of Chicago economist Richard H. Thaler and Harvard University law professor Cass R. Sunstein, have made a case for what they call "libertarian paternalism." At first glance the term seems like an oxymoron. After all, the term "libertarian" is generally taken to refer to a philosophy in which each person's freedom to make his non-coercive and non-fraudulent choices is not forcefully restrained by others. "Paternalism" is generally taken to mean that someone in charge is making choices for others, sometimes using coercion. But an article that Thaler and Sunstein wrote in the American Economic Review 1 had persuaded me that it isn't necessarily an oxymoron. I'll say more on that below.
The big question that libertarian paternalism raises is not whether such an idea is plausible. The big question is: how is it used? Are its most prominent advocates really libertarian paternalists or are they paternalists in sheep's clothing? My answer is that Thaler seems to be somewhat of a libertarian paternalist whereas Sunstein appears to be more of a straight coercive paternalist. But even Thaler passes up major chances to advocate reducing straight paternalism by making it more libertarian. That leads to another question: Should those who favor freedom reject the concept of libertarian paternalism altogether or should they, rather, take the offensive and use the Thaler/Sunstein (henceforth, TS) framework to do what TS should have done: Use the concepts that TS have used to push for a less coercive government. I argue for the latter.
The Nature of Humans
Why do TS advocate libertarian paternalism, rather than just libertarianism, in the first place? The reason has to do with the nature of humans and what is now called "behavioral economics." Of course all economics is about behavior, a fact that makes the term a misnomer. But what behavioral economics is about is the limited capacity humans have for making rational decisions. In the first five chapters of their book, Nudge, 2 TS lay out the difference between their model of humans, whom they call "Humans," and the economists' model of humans, whom they call "Econs."
Whereas Econs evaluate every situation, judging costs and benefits, and quickly and accurately calculating probabilities, "Humans" look for rules of thumb. Rules of thumb substitute for thinking, which means that they save time and mental effort-effort that most people find daunting or simply would rather not exert because it's not fun or because there are better things to do. The problem is, write TS, that sometimes these rules of thumb cause us to make very bad decisions. They highlight three rules of thumb: anchoring, availability, and representativeness. I'll highlight two, anchoring and availability. First, anchoring. Imagine that you're asked to estimate the population of Milwaukee. Let's say you live in Chicago and you know that Chicago has about three million people and that Milwaukee is smaller. Three million becomes your anchor and you estimate down to, say, one million. But if you live in Green Bay, population 100,000, and you know that Milwaukee is substantially bigger, you might estimate 300,000. Green Bay's population is your anchor. The Green Bay resident estimates low because of his anchor, and the Chicagoan estimates high because of his anchor (Milwaukee's population is 599,000.)
Availability has to do with ready examples that come to mind. Consider the case of homicides versus suicides. Examples of homicides are more "available" than those of suicides. Homicides are typically reported in newspapers whereas suicides often go unreported. The result is that many people think that homicides are more frequent than suicides. In fact, the opposite is the case. Or take terrorism. Virtually everyone in the United States over about age 19 knows about 9/11, and the "availability" of this example of terrorism causes people to dramatically overestimate the probability of another terrorist attack.
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Implications for Employers' Policies
What does the above have to do with libertarian paternalism? TS go from this reasoning about Humans and Econs to how subtle differences in various institutions can cause enormous differences in behavior. Enter the "nudge." Their idea is that various players-employers and governments, mainlyshould nudge people in the direction of "good" choices while letting them, if they wish, opt out at a low cost. They call this "choice architecture."
Consider one of their examples: the decision to enroll in your employer's 401-k or 403-b plan. Most employers do not automatically enroll you. To be enrolled, you typically must fill out a form. So not being enrolled is the "default option." But it doesn't have to be that way. The default option could be for the employer to enroll you for the minimum percent of your pay that gets you the maximum of your employer's matching payment. Then, if you want not to be enrolled, you can get out. If all people were Econs, there would be virtually no difference between outcomes under these two options. The small cost of filling out a form to enroll or to disenroll would be rounding error compared to the costs and benefits of being in or out. So the choice of default options should not matter. But it matters crucially. TS tell of a study 4 in which under the opt-in approach at one firm, only 20 % joined at first, and this number rose to 65 % after 36 months. But when the firm switched to automatic enrollment, enrollment of new employees jumped to 90 % and rose to 98 % within 36 months. As an Econ, I must admit that this is strong evidence that most people are Humans, not Econs. Notice also that a firm that chooses the automatic enrollment option is engaging in purely libertarian paternalism: it is not using force and the government is not involved.
TS praise a 2006 law, the Pension Protection Act, which gives employers a small incentive to choose the automatic enrollment option. The Act enables employers to avoid an annoying regulation that had already existed. This is clearly a move in a libertarian direction. It would have been problematic if the law imposed a new regulation and let employers out of it only by choosing automatic enrollment.
Moving Toward More Libertarian Government Policy
If TS are really libertarian paternalists and not just paternalists, do they advocate changes to make existing paternalist government policies less oppressive? If so, then they are credible. If not, then they are probably coming up with one more tiresome rationale for making government our parent, albeit a particularly sadistic parent who keeps trying to throw us in prison.
The good news is that in their co-authored book, Nudge, many of the policies they advocate would reduce government oppression. In the areas of motorcycle helmet laws, school choice, medical malpractice, and marriage, their proposals would retain some government oppression, while moving us in a more-libertarian direction.
On motorcycle helmet laws, they approvingly cite New York Times columnist John Tierney's proposal that people be allowed to go without helmets if they take an extra driving course and submit proof of health insurance. Again, this is a move away from the crushing paternalism most state governments impose by banning choice altogether.
Another important move away from the current straight paternalism that they advocate is on the issue of medical malpractice. They point out that patients now cannot sign a legally enforceable contract in which they promise not to sue for malpractice. The result is what the authors call a "forced lottery ticket." Courts are capricious in these cases, finding negligence where there isn't any and missing negligence where it exists. And the lottery ticket isn't cheap: they cite estimates that exposure to medical liability accounts for 5 to 9 % of hospital expenditures, which gets reflected in higher premiums for health insurance. Why do courts block the kind of contracts that TS claim that patients would want? They write: "The answer is nonlibertarian paternalism, pure and simple." They advocate letting patients, or their employers who buy the insurance, have an option that forbids malpractice suits. The nudge to get people to give up their lottery ticket is a default option whereby the patient gives up his right. Interestingly, the nudge here is not a big part of their proposal. What they advocate-letting people contract out of the right to sue-has been advocated for many years by many libertarians, with or without a nudge.
In a chapter titled "Privatizing Marriage," TS advocate, quite sensibly, moving in a libertarian direction on marriage by separating marriage and the state. They point out that, despite the evidence, almost 100 % of people who get married think that they are highly unlikely to get divorced. This is one of those systematic, but wrong, biases that people have. People also think that arranging pre-nuptial agreements will "spoil the mood." The result? Most people are vulnerable to "a legal system that has an astonishing degree of uncertainty." TS advocate a nudge: a default contract that helps the weakest parties, typically women. Then, people would be free to avoid the default by tailoring a contract to their desires. They also suggest that taking marriage away from the state would, with one fell swoop, solve the thorny problem of gay marriage. Let churches and other organizations choose whatever marriages they want to approve and let people choose their churches. Interestingly, their nudge is a small part of this proposal, just as with their proposal on malpractice.
Keeping Paternalism
If there were ever a case of the government substantially intruding in people's lives because government officials think that otherwise those people will not make good choices for themselves, it is Social Security. Currently, the government funds Social Security by taking 6.2 % of pay from employer and employee each, on pay up to an annual amount of $113,700.
5 For people with income at or above this $113,700 cap, the Social Security tax amounts to a hefty $7,049.40 on employer and employee each. For the vast majority of working Americans, the combined employer and employee tax is substantially above the amount of federal income tax they pay. Clearly, this is a large paternalistic program. Because the Social Security program is the largest single expenditure item in the federal government's budget, exceeding even spending on national defense, one could reasonably argue that Social Security is the largest paternalistic program that the federal government runs.
If TS strongly believe in the libertarian part of libertarian paternalism, they should advocate letting people out of Social Security as long as those let out can show that they will save an equivalent amount in a private pension plan. Interestingly, in the 1930s, when Congress was debating FDR's proposal for Social Security, the U.S. Senate voted 51 to 35 for an amendment by Senator Bennett Champ Clark of Missouri that would have exempted employers and employees who had government-approved pension plans. Unfortunately, the amendment was later removed.
So what do TS advocate as a reform for Social Security? Although they address Social Security, they do not address any reforms other than changes in taxes and benefits.
However, Richard Thaler did address Social Security further in an e-mail discussion I had with him in 2008, at the time Nudge was coming out. When I asked him about this issue, he replied: "for SS [Social Security] current old people have property rights (which we libertarians respect) and if you let young and rich people opt out who pays?" To Thaler's claim, there are two responses. First, the elderly do not have property rights, either as a matter of ethics or as a matter of Constitutional law. On the ethics, the elderly have no right to have the government forcibly take money from younger strangers who never consented to the deal and who, in fact, were not even born when the deal was made. Someone can never have a property right to forcibly take the property of someone else who obtained the property justly. If one can, I want Thaler's house. Second, on the matter of Constitutional law, the Supreme Court made clear in its Flemming v. Nestor decision, that, despite all the government's propaganda about Social Security being insurance, it is not: Social Security is a gigantic tax-and-subsidy scheme. Interestingly, TS themselves point out in Nudge that Congress is entitled to change "its" mind and that "the Constitution does not protect your right to Social Security benefits." Thaler seems confused: on the one hand, he claimed, in his e-mail discussion with me, that the elderly have a property right in Social Security and on the other hand, he and Sunstein say that this "right" is not protected. Which is it?
Moreover, even if, by some stretch, old people did have a property right, why should the government single out young people to honor it? If the government is to honor it, shouldn't it go after the people who made the commitment? One way is to attach all the property of all the Congressmen and Presidents who have ever voted for or signed a law to increase Social Security payments. This might sound extreme-no, this is extreme-and it would generate only a small fraction of the revenue required. But is it less just than having the government go after the future earnings of innocent 2-year-olds?
Another issue on which TS are silent-and should not beis the issue of income tax withholding. The U.S. federal government moved to withholding during World War II because that was when it changed the income tax from a "class tax"-that is, a tax on high-income people-to the "mass tax"-that is, a tax on all but very low-income people. Afraid that people would be faced with a huge tax bill if they were required to pay their taxes annually or quarterly, the federal government implemented an "installment plan," requiring employers to withhold taxes from their employees' paychecks. I remember having a discussion about this in the late 1970s with Thaler, when he and I were both young assistant professors at the University of Rochester. We both noted that, because of withholding, many people do not seem aware of how much they really pay in income taxes and that, if they get a big refund, they think they are not paying much. This is the kind of bias that, in other contexts, TS decry. They seem to want people to be aware of the real cost of various things and not to under-or over-estimate. So a straightforward way to do that with taxes is to end withholding. If people were required to pay taxes on an annual or quarterly basis, they, especially high-income people, would become more aware of the cost of government and would likely estimate it to be higher than they now think it is. The result would likely be more resistance to government expansion. It's pretty clear that libertarians would like this outcome. And, given TS's basis for libertarian paternalism-people's systematic tendency to misestimate based on readily available data-and their alleged libertarianism, they should like both the process that leads to the result-namely, people having better information-and the result itself. Yet they say not a word about tax withholding.
Expanding Paternalism: From Nudge to Iron Fist
I noted earlier that Thaler seems to be more libertarian than Sunstein. My evidence for that is Sunstein's latest book, Simpler: The Future of Government. 6 In at least three instances in that book, Sunstein crosses the line from advocating nudges to advocating outright old-fashioned coercion: price controls, restrictions on the size of soda containers, and graphic warnings about smoking.
Take price controls. In a discussion in which he makes the case for disclosure requirements, he touts disclosure requirements for health insurance companies. His case for disclosure is that it allows consumers to know more about what they are buying. That sounds reasonably sensible. But then Sunstein writes:"The Affordable Care Act also enlists disclosure to constrain increases in health insurance premiums. The act requires the secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the states to establish a process for the annual review of 'unreasonable increases' in premiums. That process in turn requires health insurance issuers to justify any apparently unreasonable increase before it can be implemented."
7 In other words, Sunstein is not advocating simple disclosure. Instead, he advocates price controls. Sunstein, who is obviously economically literate, does not seem to feel the need to justify price controls, despite the fact that opposition to price controls and the distortions they cause is one of the things on which the vast majority of economists agree.
Or consider New York City mayor Michael Bloomberg's move in 2012 to limit the size of soda containers to 16 oz. Sunstein points out an obvious fact: that the limit would not have allowed people to choose a larger size. Yet, in discussing comedian Jon Stewart's negative reaction to Bloomberg's ban on larger containers, Sunstein writes, "Stewart is capturing a pervasive and general skepticism about paternalism in general and nudges in particular." 8 Here, Sunstein himself is incoherent. As he had admitted a few lines earlier, Bloomberg's regulation was a ban, not a nudge. Sunstein might argue that it is a nudge because one can always buy multiple containers. But that is costly. Moreover, what if someone wants 20 oz of a soda? It is hard to buy a 4-oz drink. Sunstein seems to be illustrating precisely what many libertarian critics had feared: Sunstein, one of the primary advocates of nudges and libertarian paternalism, seems quite comfortable with oldfashioned coercive paternalism.
Finally, consider the graphic warnings that the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) wants to require on cigarette packs. Such warnings include disgusting pictures of people with bad health due to smoking. Sunstein claims that such warnings "are a distinctive kind of nudge." "However graphic," he writes, "the warnings maintain freedom of choice."
9 It is true that, with the graphic warnings in place, people would still be able to choose to buy cigarettes. But more than one choice is involved. Another choice is the kind of package in which people buy their cigarettes. The FDA regulation that Sunstein supports would substantially limit people's choices. Call it a hunch, 10 but I think most smokers would rather not buy their cigarettes in such packages. My guess is that the reason Sunstein is oblivious to that lack of choice is that he is not in the market for cigarettes. I wonder how he would feel if, when he ordered a fattening dessert in a fancy restaurant, the server were required to serve it with pictures of people who are in poor health because of overeating such desserts.
Moreover, whether the issue is cigarettes, cars, drugs, or any other good, Sunstein consistently puts a zero weight on the freedom of producers. In discussing the various examples he cites, Sunstein devotes not a sentence of concern for their freedom-or lack of. His indifference to producers' freedom becomes explicit in his discussion of regulations on advertising airline fees. In 2011, notes Sunstein, the Department of Transportation introduced a regulation to require "airlines to disclose prominently all potential fees on their web sites." 11 "Even better," he writes, "airlines have to include all government taxes and fees in every advertised price." Sunstein notes that some airlines sued to invalidate the regulation, "complaining especially about the requirement to include taxes and fees and invoking the First Amendment, no less, to say that the requirement was unconstitutional." Here's what he does not disclose: the airlines that sued, in Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. Department of Transportation, wanted to be able to state the government taxes on the ticket in a font as big as the font on the overall price. But the regulation prohibits them from doing so. So passengers won't be as aware of the government's role in high airfares as of the fares themselves. That sounds like a First Amendment case to me. You would think that Sunstein would understand that. After all, his book is a commercial product and he left out this important piece of information. In that sense, he's like an airline that leaves out information about high baggage fees. Yet I bet he would object to a law requiring him to tell the reader the whole story. To his credit, he earlier rejected his own tentative proposal for a "fairness doctrine" for the Internet; he had toyed with the idea of legally requiring bloggers to link to contrary views.
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That Sunstein even seriously thought of that idea, though, suggests that on the issue of free speech, he has a tin ear.
It also shows something else. Again, he had the chance, as in the case of tax withholding, to make a case for making people aware of the true cost of government. But the DOT regulation he defends forces airlines to make the true cost of government less noticeable. Even if Sunstein has no commitment to freedom of speech, he should be arguing for allowing consumer/voter awareness, not for suppressing it.
I used to think that some of my libertarian friends and colleagues exaggerated in their criticisms of "libertarian paternalism" in the hands of Thaler and Sunstein. But Sunstein's book, Simpler, has brought me much closer to their conclusion. George Mason University economist Don Boudreaux, in addressing New York Times columnist David Brooks's claim that one need not worry much about "nudges" by government turning into "diktats," said it best:
"One reason why the empirical record isn't more full of nudges turning into diktats is that government typically issues diktats from the get-go. We Americans were commanded, without any prior 'nudging,' to use low-flow faucets. We were commanded, without prior 'nudging,' not to use marijuana. We were commanded, without prior 'nudging,' to set aside a portion of our earnings into Social Security. Ditto, of course, for countless other aspects of our lives-including being commanded by Obamacare, without prior 'nudging,' to buy health insurance as designed by government officials." 13 So the only way that TS can really establish their "libertarian cred" is by going the opposite way: disowning the heavily coercive policies they, and especially Sunstein, advocate and pushing further, as they did somewhat in Nudge, for moves from straight paternalism to actual "libertarian paternalism." But should we wait for them? If we do, I fear we will wait a long time. Instead, we should be using their arguments and following them to their logical conclusion. They are right about people's limited capacity for good decision-making. So one reasonable step is to let people out of the most coercive government programs-and there are many to choose fromif they demonstrate awareness of the issues. I remember talking to a young man who had just earned his first pay statement and noticed the letters "FICA" 14 above the biggest amount withheld. When I told him what it was, he was incensed. "Can't I go to the Social Security office and explain to them that I am responsible and that, if they agree not to take the amount out, I will put that amount into my savings?" I had to tell him no, even though his idea made perfect sense. But that young man should have been able to opt out.
My fellow blogger, Bryan Caplan, advocates an even more radical solution, for Social Security and for other government programs, that takes account of the insights of the behavioral economists. He writes: "Instead of requiring everyone to pay Social Security taxes to provide for their retirement, we should allow people to opt out of the system if they write a one-page essay explaining why they prefer to handle their retirement on their own. Analogous opt-out rules should be devised for government health care programs, worker protection laws, consumer protection laws, and so on." Of course, you might want to tweak these proposals a tad. But if you really believe in the effectiveness of "nudging," such policies deserve serious consideration. 15 The Invisible Gorilla Libertarians are also particularly well situated to take the TS thinking in a new direction where TS seem to fear to tread: applying the insights of behavioral economics to a particularly powerful group of people, namely, government officials.
Let me explain. In a fascinating chapter, "Invisible Gorillas and Human Herds,"
16 Sunstein tells about an experiment in which people who were asked to watch a video and count basketball passes totally missed seeing a gorilla in the midst of the players. The lesson for businesses, individuals, and governments is, he writes, "that we are all at risk of missing a lot that is happening in the background (and possibly even the foreground) of our lives." Indeed.
That brings me to the 800-lb gorilla in the room-government-and a large irony in Simpler that Sunstein seems unaware of. In one passage, he notes that he delayed getting vaccinated for H1N1. Why do I highlight that fact? Because I would argue that it illustrates a fundamental contradiction. Sunstein's delay shows that even he is subject to the thinking that he wants the government to "nudge," or outright coerce, us out of. He even admits, just four pages earlier, that for many people, "including those who work in government, what may matter most is today, tomorrow, and next week." Yet, he wants us to trust these selfsame government officials to make major decisions-about drugs, medical care, cars, and cigarettes, to name only a few-for us. If those government officials can't be trusted to take the long view when their own wellbeing is at stake, why would Sunstein think that we can trust them to do so for a nation of strangers?
The very insights that TS have about human behavior apply even more strongly to the humans in government because, besides being human and having the limits that regular humans have, they have even less incentive than average people have to make good decisions about their lives. If something in our lives goes wrong, even badly wrong, due to a government official's decision, the government official typically bears very little cost for that bad decision. That explains why government so often makes bad decisions.
Interestingly, one early pioneer in behavioral economics, although he did not use term "behavioral economics," is the late Friedrich Hayek. In 1960, Hayek wrote: "[A]ll men in pursuit of immediate aims are apt-or, because of the limitation of their intellect, in fact bound-to violate rules of conduct which they would nevertheless wish to see generally observed. Because of the restricted capacity of our minds, our immediate purposes will always loom large, and we will tend to sacrifice long-term advantages to them. In individual as in social conduct we can therefore approach a measure of rationality or consistency in making particular decisions only by submitting to general principles, irrespective of momentary needs. Legislation can no more dispense with guidance by principles than any other human activity if it is to take account of effects in the aggregate." 17 Significantly, as Don Boudreaux notes, 18 this passage appears in a discussion of the U.S. Constitution. Hayek understood, even then, that the very limits of our rationality argue for not having government have a big role in our private lives.
Copyright of Society is the property of Springer Science & Business Media B.V. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.
